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STATIONARY STRATEGIES IN ZERO-SUM
STOCHASTIC GAMES
J. FLESCH, F. THUIJSMAN and O. J. VRIEZE
Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University,
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
We deal with zero-sum stochastic games. We demonstrate the importance of stationary
strategies by showing that stationary strategies are better (in terms of the rewards they
guarantee for a player, against any strategy of his opponent) than (1) pure strategies
(even history-dependent ones), (2) strategies which may use only a finite number of
different mixed actions in any state, and (3) strategies with finite recall. Examples are
given to clarify the issues.
1. Introduction
A zero-sum stochastic game Γ can be described by a state space S := {1, . . . , z},
and a corresponding collection {M1, . . . ,Mz} of matrices, where matrix Ms has
size m1s × m2s and, for a ∈ As := {1, . . . ,m1s} and b ∈ Bs := {1, . . . ,m2s}, entry
(a, b) of Ms consists of a payoff rs(a, b) ∈ R and a probability vector ps(a, b) =
(ps(t|a, b))t∈S . The elements of S are called states and for each state s ∈ S the
elements of As and Bs are called (pure) actions of players 1 and 2 in state s. The
game is to be played at stages in N in the following way. The play starts at stage 1
in an initial state, say in state s1 ∈ S, where, simultaneously and independently,
both players are to choose an action: player 1 chooses a row a1 ∈ As1 , while player 2
chooses a column b1 ∈ Bs1 . These choices induce an immediate payoff rs1(a1, b1)
from player 2 to player 1. Next, the play moves to a new state according to the
probability vector ps1(a
1, b1), say to state s2. At stage 2, new actions a2 ∈ As2
and b2 ∈ Bs2 are to be chosen by the players in state s2. Then player 1 receives
payoff rs2(a
2, b2) from player 2 and the play moves to some state s3 according to
the probability vector ps2(a
2, b2), and so on.
The sequence hn = (s1, a1, b1; . . . ; sn, an, bn) is called the history up to stage n.
The players are assumed to have complete information and perfect recall.
A mixed action for a player in state s is a probability distribution on the set of
his actions in state s. Mixed actions in state s will be denoted by xs for player 1
and by ys for player 2, and the sets of mixed actions in state s by Xs and Ys,
respectively.
Naturally, As ⊂ Xs and Bs ⊂ Ys for all states s ∈ S. A (history-dependent)
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in the present state s for any past history h of the play. For player 2, (history-
dependent) strategies σ are defined similarly. We use the notations Π and Σ for the
respective (history-dependent) strategy spaces of the players. If the mixed actions
prescribed by a strategy only depend on the current state, then the strategy is called
stationary. Thus, the stationary strategy spaces are X := ×s∈SXs for player 1 and
Y := ×s∈SYs for player 2. We will use the respective notations x and y for stationary
strategies for players 1 and 2.
A strategy π is called pure if it always prescribes a pure action with probability
1, namely πs(h) ∈ As for all states s and histories h. Pure strategies are defined in
a similar way for player 2. A pair of strategies (π, σ) together with an initial state
s ∈ S determine a stochastic process on the payoffs. The sequences of payoffs are
evaluated by the average reward, given by











where rn denotes the random variable for the payoff at stage n.
For any initial state s ∈ S, it is in the spirit of the game to evaluate a strategy













ψs(σ) =: vs ∀ s ∈ S .
Here, v := (vs)s∈S is called the average value of the game. A strategy π of player 1
is called ε-optimal, ε ≥ 0, if
φs(π) ≥ vs − ε ∀ s ∈ S .
Similarly, a strategy σ of player 2 is called ε-optimal, ε ≥ 0, if
ψs(σ) ≤ vs + ε ∀ s ∈ S .
Because of the definition of the value v, both players have ε-optimal strategies
for all ε > 0. However, 0-optimal strategies do not generally exist and stationary
strategies are not always sufficient to achieve ε-optimality for all ε > 0 [see the
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2. The Results
We start with the following theorem, which states that, for each player, there exists
a pure stationary strategy which is at least as good as any other pure (possibly
history-dependent) strategy.
Theorem 2.1. In any zero-sum stochastic game G, there exists a pure stationary
strategy x for player 1 such that for any initial state s ∈ S and any pure strategy π
φs(x) ≥ φs(π) .
A similar statement holds for player 2.
Proof. We only prove the statement for player 1; for player 2 a similar proof can
be given. When player 1 uses a pure strategy (possibly a history-dependent one),
then at any stage of the play, player 2 knows in advance which action player 1 is
going to choose. Therefore, we examine a related zero-sum game Ḡ in which player 1
chooses an action first and then player 2 has to make his move. This can be done by
replacing each state s by a state (s, 0) and, for each a ∈ As, a state (s, a). State (s, 0)
has actions sets As for player 1 and {1} for player 2; all payoffs are 0 and action
a ∈ As leads to state (s, a) with probablility 1. State (s, a) has actions sets {1} for
player 1 and Bs for player 2; action b ∈ Bs gives a payoff 2 · rs(a, b) to player 1 and
leads to state (t, 0) with probability ps(t|a, b). The game Ḡ is a so-called perfect
information game, i.e. a stochastic game where in each state at most one player
has a non-trivial set of actions. For such games, it is well known [cf. Liggett and
Lippman (1969)] that player 1 has pure stationary optimal strategies (and so has
player 2). Any such optimal strategy is better than any pure strategy for player 1
in the game Ḡ and, therefore, it corresponds in an obvious one-to-one fashion to a
pure stationary strategy in the original game with the required property.











Player 1’s actions are the rows, while players 2’s actions are the columns. In
each entry, the payoff is placed in the upper left corner, while the number in the
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Following the construction in the proof of Theorem 2.1, the related zero-sum







(1, 0) (2, 0)
(1, 1)
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One can easily verify that the pure stationary strategies
x̄ = ((1, 0), (1), (1), (1, 0), (1), (1))
ȳ = ((1), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1), (1), (1))
are optimal for the respective players in Ḡ, guaranteeing the value ῡ = 2. So, the
corresponding pure stationary strategy for player 1 in the original game G is
x = ((1, 0), (1, 0)) .
Clearly, x guarantees φ1(x) = φ2(x) = 2 in G, and no pure strategy (not even a
history-dependent one) is able to guarantee more than 2.
Theorem 2.1 has the following consequence, which says that if a player is re-
stricted to using only a finite number of mixed actions, in all states, then he cannot
do better than to use a stationary strategy.
Corollary 2.1. Let X̃s be a non-empty and finite subset of Xs, for all s ∈ S. Then
there exists a stationary strategy x̃ for player 1 with the following properties:
(1) x̃s ∈ X̃s for all s ∈ S.
(2) Suppose that π is a strategy for player 1 such that πs(h) ∈ X̃s for any present
state s ∈ S and past history h. Then, for any initial state s ∈ S
φs(x̃) ≥ φs(π) . (1)
A similar statement holds for player 2 as well.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. One only has to define a zero-sum game G̃
with the same state space S̃ = S, such that in any state s ∈ S, player 1’s actions are
exactly the elements of X̃s, player 2’s action space remains Bs, while the payoffs
and transitions are given by taking expectations. Then by applying Theorem 2.1 for
G̃, we obtain a pure stationary strategy x̃ in G̃, which is also a stationary strategy
of the original game G (not necessarily pure though). Both required properties of
x̃ follow immediately.
Next, we deal with strategies which, for some m ∈ N∪{0}, use only the present
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stages). It turns out that, perhaps surprisingly, these strategies are not any better
than stationary strategies (which have no recall at all).
Corollary 2.2. Suppose a strategy π of player 1 satisfies for some m ∈ N∪{0} that
for any present state s ∈ S and for all histories (s1, a1, b1; . . . ; sn+m, an+m, bn+m),
for all n ∈ N, the prescribed mixed action
πs(s1, a1, b1; . . . ; sn+m, an+m, bn+m)
is independent of (s1, a1, b1; . . . ; sn, an, bn).
Then, there exists a stationary strategy x for player 1 such that for any initial
state s ∈ S
φs(x) ≥ φs(π) .
Proof. Since m is fixed, strategy π can only prescribe finitely many different mixed
actions, in all states of the game. Therefore, the result immediately follows from
Corollary 2.1.
Finally, we wish to make some remarks regarding Corollary 2.2. (Similar remarks
could be made on Corollary 2.1 as well.)
Remark 2.1. In Corollary 2.2, the condition that π has finite recall is crucial, as
shown by a famous example, called the Big Match, which was introduced by Gillette
(1957) and solved by Blackwell and Ferguson (1968). In that example, if player 1 is
able to recall all the past actions of player 2 then he can guarantee higher rewards
than by stationary strategies.
What is more, in another example by Flesch et al. (1999), it is sufficient to
know only the present stage of the play (the “length” of the history) in order to
























The notation is similar to that of Example 2.1. States 3 and 4 are so called
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This game has the following properties for initial states 1 and 2:
(a) The value is v1 = v2 = 1.
(b) For all ε > 0, player 1 has ε-optimal strategies that depend only on the stage
number. Indeed, define strategy fK for player 1, where K ∈ N, as follows:





for all n ∈ N .
Observe that this strategy fK is symmetric in the sense that the prescribed
mixed actions in states 1 and 2 are the same for any stage n. Note that these
Top probabilities converge to 1 as n tends to infinity, so fK assigns less and
less probabilities to actions B1 and B2.
For initial states 1 and 2, for all ε > 0, if K ∈ N is large, then player 1 can
guarantee a reward at least 1− ε by playing the strategy fK , namely
φ1(f
K) ≥ 1− ε, φ2(fK) ≥ 1− ε .
(c) Player 1 has no stationary ε-optimal strategy for initial states 1 and 2, if ε ∈
[0, 1). In fact, player 1 can get at most 0 for initial states 1 and 2 by playing
stationary strategies, namely
φ1(x) = φ2(x) = 0 ∀ x .
Note that (b) implies (a), because the highest payoff in the game is 1.
Now we briefly explain (b). The question here is how player 2 can reply to the
strategy fK . Intuitively, player 2 has two hopes to decrease player 1’s reward. The
first one is achieving absorption in entry (B2, L2) with payoff 0. Player 2’s best
candidate would be playing actions L1 and L2 whenever the play is in state 1 or in
state 2. But then whenever the play is in state 2, a transition occurs to state 1 with
a large probability, and it takes a long time until the play comes back to state 2
again. Because the strategy fK assigns decreasing probabilities to action B1, the
lengths of stay in state 1 will increase fast during the play and the frequency of
visits to state 2 will tend to zero. As a consequence, the frequency of stages when
absorption could occur is zero (in the limit) and the probabilities on action B2 at
those stages will decrease “rapidly”. Therefore, the overall probability of absorption
in entry (B2, L2) will be small. In conclusion, playing L1 and L2 gives player 2 little
hope.
On the other hand, since the payoffs in entries (T1, R1) and (T2, R2) equal 0,
player 2 could try to play actions R1 and R2 with a “positive” frequency and
hope that the play will not absorb. But in that case, the frequency of stages when
absorption could occur is positive and the probabilities onB1 and B2 at those stages
decrease “slowly”. Hence, it will appear that the play must eventually absorb with
probability 1, and then the zero payoffs in entries (T1, R1) and (T2, R2) will have
no influence on the reward.
Finally, we discuss (c). Note that strategies are completely determined by the
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define a strategy yx = (yx1 , y
x
2 ) for player 2: let
yx1 :=
{




(0, 1) if x2 = (1, 0)
(1, 0) otherwise.
Notice that, for s = 1, 2, we have γs(x, y
x) = 0 for all x, so the proof of (c) is
complete.
Remark 2.2. Note that, in Corollary 2.2, the stationary strategy x depends on π.

























∀ n ∈ N .
However, there is no stationary strategy which would guarantee 1 for initial
state 1, hence there is no x with the property that
φ(x) ≥ φ(πn) ∀ n ∈ N .
Nevertheless, in any zero-sum stochastic game, for any ε > 0 one can show the




(in the example above, take πn with a large n ∈ N). Then, by Corollary 2.2, we
obtain for all initial states s ∈ S that
φs(xε) ≥ φs(π)− ε
whenever π has finite recall. (So xε is independent of π).
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